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DOES THE SUPREME COURT'S BURLINGTON NORTHERN
DECISION REQUIRE RECONSIDERATION OF THE ACETO
LINE OF "ARRANGER" LIABILITY CASES?
Aaron Gershonowitzt
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 1 (CERCLA or the Superfund Law) states that a
person who "arranged for disposal" of hazardous substances may be
liable for remediation costs at an inactive hazardous waste site. 2
Courts have generally interpreted "arranged for disposal" broadly to
include anyone who had responsibility for the hazardous substances. 3
The Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Aceto Agricultural
Chemicals Corp.4 represents perhaps the most expansive reading of
arranger liability, holding that a corporation can be liable even
though the corporation never possessed the waste and made no
decisions regarding disposal. 5 The Aceto theory of arranger liability
has been followed by several other federal circuit courts of appeals. 6
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States
(Burlington Northern),7 the Supreme Court addressed an arranger
liability issue that is, on its face, unrelated to the Aceto line of cases.
The issue was whether a seller of chemicals could be held liable as an
arranger when chemicals it sold accidentally spilled on delivery. 8
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the seller could be liable
as an arranger. 9 The Supreme Court reversed, and limited arranger
t
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Partner, Forchelli, Curto, Crowe, Deegan, Schwartz, Mineo & Cohn LLP, Uniondale,
New York. Adjunct Faculty, University of Phoenix Online Campus.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
ld. § 9607(a)(3) (imposing liability on "any person who by contract, agreement, or
otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned
or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances").
See. e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
Id.
See infra Part II (discussing the Aceto decision).
See infra Part I1.B (discussing the court of appeals decisions that have followed the
Aceto theory ofliability).
129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
Id. at 1878.
United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 930 (9th Cir. 2008).
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liability to actions intended to dispose of hazardous substances
because "arrange" means to make a plan, and one cannot make a plan
accidentally. 10
This article will assess whether the Court's reasoning in Burlington
Northern limits the scope of arranger liability so much that the Aceto
line cannot survive. In particular, it will examine whether the
Burlington Northern Court meant that all arrangers must intend to
arrange for disposal or whether the decision should be read more
narrowly to conclude that a seller of a useful non-waste product can
only be liable as an arranger ifhe or she intends a disposal.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Development of the Arranger Concept

The Superfund Law does not define arrange or include any
discussion of what it means to arrange for disposal. 11 There is no
legislative history directly addressing the meaning of arranger
liability.12 The only legislative history that might suggest a meaning
for the arranger concept is the legislative history that identifies the
concepts Congress discussed, rejected, and replaced with the arranger
concept. 13
One bill that preceded the Superfund Law provided that a waste
generator is liable for remediation costs. 14 Generator, unlike
arranger, was a familiar environmental law concept because the

10.
11.
12.

13.

14.

Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1879.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9607 (2006).
A number of courts have noted that CERCLA was hurriedly put together and passed
with very little debate so that the legislative history provides little help in
understanding the phrase. See, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872
F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,
1039-40 (2d Cir. 1985).
See ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.1, at 45 (West Publ'g Co. 1992) (,,[T]here are no committee or conference reports
addressing the version of the legislation that ultimately became law" and "reports
pertaining to the prior version of the legislation are of little value. "); see also Frank P.
Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1
(1982); Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1458,
1465-66 (1985-1986) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
See H.R. REp. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 29 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119,
6132 ("Subsection (b) [of section 3041] defines the term 'responsible party' to mean
any person who ... generated or disposed of a substantial portion of the hazardous
waste treated, stored or disposed of at the inactive site.").
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Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)15 already imposed
significant waste management obligations on the waste generator. 16
A competing bill did not impose liability on generators or arrangers,
but instead used a causation concept-the person who caused or
contributed to the contamination would be liable for the cleanup
costs. 17
Because the debate between generator liability and causation
liability seems to have resulted in arranger liability, a closer look at
those concepts may shed light on the intended scope of arranger
liability. The primary difference between RCRA and CERCLA is
that RCRA regulates hazardous waste activities 18 while CERCLA
provides a liability system for inactive hazardous sites-places where
waste was disposed of in the past. 19 The key regulated party under
RCRA is the waste generator. 20 Anyone who has a manufacturing or
industrial process that results in the creation of hazardous waste is the
generator of that waste, and RCRA tells that person how to store,
handle, and dispose of hazardous waste. 21 CERCLA, on the other
hand, describes how to clean up inactive hazardous waste sites 22 and

15.
16.
17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2006). Generator is defined in § 6903(6).
ld. § 6922 (discussing standards for generators of hazardous waste).
H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 14-15,68 (stating that basing liability on causation
would be more fair than imposing liability on generators because mere generation of
waste does not cause a release to the environment).
42 U.S.c. §§ 6921-693ge (dealing with hazardous waste management). See § 6921
for the definition of hazardous waste, § 6922 for standards for generators of hazardous
waste, and § 6923 for standards for owners and operators of hazardous waste
treatment, storage and disposal facilities.
See Sen. Robert T. Stafford, Why Superfund Was Needed, 7 EPA J. 8, 9-10 (1981)
(discussing the goals ofCERCLA); see also TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 13, § 2.1, at
24-25 (noting that Superfund primarily addresses present conditions that are the result
of past acts).
See 40 C.F .R. § 262 (2010). RCRA generators must identify which of their wastes are
hazardous, see id. § 261 (addressing waste identification), handle them in a manner
that reduces exposure, see id. § 262, pt. C (addressing packaging, labeling, and other
pre-transport requirements), and document proper disposal, see id. § 262, pt. B
(dealing with waste tracking).
See 42 U.S.C § 6903(6) (defining "hazardous waste generation" as "the act or process
of producing hazardous waste"); id. § 6992(a).
Id. § 9605 (requiring the preparation of a National Contingency Plan that "shall
establish procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous
substances").
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states who can be held liable for the cleanup costS. 23 It does not
regulate business activities. 24
With that difference in mind, Congress considered whether the
person with the waste handling and disposal obligations under RCRA
should also be a person who is liable for the remediation of inactive
hazardous waste sites. 25 The generator was a good candidate for
liability for several reasons. If liability was to be imposed on those
who benefited economically from the disposal of the waste, the
generator fit the bill because it engaged in the business activity that
created the waste. 26 If the liability system was intended to serve as a
deterrent to the creation of new inactive hazardous waste sites,
making the generator a liable party also made sense because the
generator is the first person to have control of the waste and therefore
has the ability to control how to dispose of the waste. 27
The alternative considered by Congress followed more of a tort
model that imposed liability on all who caused or contributed to the
contamination without regard to how the waste came into existence. 28
If the problem being addressed by Congress was the presence of
inactive hazardous waste sites,29 it made sense to place responsibility
for the problem on those who caused the existence of the inactive
hazardous waste sites. 30 Tort law has long provided strict liability for
those involved in ultra-hazardous or unreasonably dangerous
activities. 31 Some courts have included the handling of hazardous
substances as such an activity. 32 Thus, liability for all who cause or

23.
24.

25.

26.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. § 9607 (describing who can be liable for the costs of responding to the release of
hazardous substances).
See Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,45
Bus. LAW. 923, 924 (1989-1990) (stating that CERCLA authorizes governments and
private parties to cleanup toxic substances and recover their costs).
Keith M. Lyons, Jr., Comment, Everyone Pays to Clean Up America: A Discussion of
CERCLA Section J07(a)(3) and the Term "Arrangedfor Disposal," 28 W1LLAMETTE
L. REv. 589, 597 (1992).
See United States v. Ne. Phann. & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir. 1986)
(discussing the legislative history of CERCLA and stating that Congress intended to
impose the costs pn "those parties who created and profited from the sites").
See Ohio ex rei. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
Ne. Pharm. & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d at 733 (noting that Congress imposed liability
"upon those who created and profited from the sites").
See Stafford, supra note 19, at 9; see also Lyons, supra note 25, at 597.
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (D. Colo. 1985).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519,520,520 cmt. h (1976).
See, e.g., Yommer v. McKenzie 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969) (storage of
flammable materials); Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (cyanide gas).
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contribute to the contamination at an inactive hazardous waste site
would not have been a significant change in existing law. 33
Both the generator and causation concepts are inadequate for the
job intended by Congress. Generator is too limited a concept because
Congress decided not to limit the Superfund Law to remediation of
hazardous waste. 34 Many of the sites that needed to be cleaned up
were contaminated with hazardous substances that might not meet the
RCRA definition of hazardous waste. 35 Because the RCRA generator
concept relates to waste and not to substances, generator was too
limited a concept to describe all of the persons that Congress
intended to be liable for remediation costS.36
While the generator concept was too limited because it did not
include all the types of sites Congress intended to address, it may also
have been too broad from a fairness perspective. 37 If a company
generated the waste but played no role in the decision to dispose of it
at a particular facility, should they have liability? For example,
Company A generates waste, which it determines can be reused, and
it sells the waste to Company B, who intends to reuse it. Company B
reuses some of it and disposes of the rest. Is there any reason that
Company A, the waste generator, should be responsible for Company
B's disposal?38
Causation was a familiar tort concept and a logical candidate for
the source of liability. 39 If the goal is to determine who should clean
33.
34.

35.

36.

37.
38.

39.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519,520,520 cmt. h (1976).
CERCLA uses the phrase "hazardous substances," and the definition of hazardous
substance includes hazardous waste as a subset of hazardous substance. 42 U.S.C. §
9601(14) (2006).
The RCRA regulations identify many hazardous wastes based on the process that
created them. See 40 C.F.R. § 26l.32 (2010). At many inactive hazardous waste
sites, there was a mixture of substances whose origin or prior use was difficult to
determine. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 260-61 (3d
Cir. 1992). Additionally, spills or releases of virgin chemicals (not waste) could
create the same dangers as hazardous waste. See id. Thus, the need to clean up a
mess should not be dependent on whether the mess is hazardous waste. See id.
(discussing Congress's intent regarding the difference between hazardous waste and
hazardous substances).
See A/can, 964 F.2d at 260 (discussing Congress's intent regarding why the CERCLA
definition of hazardous substances is broader than the RCRA definition of hazardous
waste).
See H.R. REp. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 68 (1980).
See id. (stating that basing liability on "causation" would be fairer because "[t]he mere
fact of generating a hazardous waste should not make the generator liable" for its
release).
See id.
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up the mess, then how the mess was created is very important.
Indeed, one could make the case that how the waste got there is more
important to the liability issue than who created the waste. 40 The
focus on causation, however, suggests that the person is liable
because they have done something wrong. Congress was careful not
to base Superfund Law liability on the notion of wrongdoing. 41 For
example, the owner and operator of the facility are liable for
remediation costs without regard to whether they ever had anything
to do with hazardous substances. 42 Additionally, most of the
hazardous substances that needed to be remediated were disposed of
legally. 43 The responsible parties were often engaged in the ordinary
course of business at a time when environmental regulations did not
exist. 44
Congress did not want to indicate that what most
corporations were doing was tortious. 45 Therefore, they set up a
system of liability without fault-the message is that the waste has to
be cleaned up regardless of how it got there.
The bill that became the Superfund Law did not contain generator
liability and did not provide for liability based on causation. 46
Instead, it contained this arranger concept. 47 As one court described
it, "Congress did not, to say the least, leave the flood lights on to
illuminate the trail to the intended meaning of arranger status.,,48
Nevertheless, the arranger concept is generally seen as some
40.
41.

42.

43.

44.
45.
46.

47.
48.

See id. at 69.
See TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 13, § 4.2, at 337-38 (stating that courts have
"unanimously concluded that the appropriate standard under CERCLA is strict
liability," citing two pages worth of cases).
See 42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(l) (2006) (providing liability for the "owner or operator of a
vessel or facility"); id. § 9607(a)(2) (providing liability for "any person who at the
time of disposal of any hazardous substance[s] owned or operated any facility at
which such substances were disposed of').
See Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1467-70 (describing the lack of
federal regulation over hazardous waste disposal until the risks associated with
improper disposal became evident in the 1960s and 1970s).
See id. at 1462 (discussing the creation and disposal of hazardous waste by various
industries prior to the enactment of CERCLA).
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (imposing liability without fault).
See id. For an explanation of how new concepts could be found in the final version
without explanation, see TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 13, § 1.1, at 5 (describing "last
minute, unrecorded compromises and acceptance of deliberate ambiguity in some of
the bill's more controversial provisions"); see also United States v. Price, 577 F.
Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.NJ. 1983) ("Even the legislative history must be read with
caution since last minute changes in the bill were inserted with little or no
explanation. ").
42 U.S.c. § 9607(a)(3).
United States v. New Castle Cnty., 727 F. Supp. 854, 871 (D. Del. 1989).
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combination of the generator and causation concepts. 49 When a
person causes waste to be disposed of, the person has arranged for
disposal of the waste. Similarly, because RCRA defines waste as
something that is to be discarded, once hazardous waste is generated,
there is little one can do with it other than arrange to have it
discarded; when you arrange to have it discarded, you have arranged
for its disposal. 50
B.

Early Arranger Cases Emphasized Generator Status Over
Causation

The early arranger cases were primarily generator cases. It quickly
became clear that generators of hazardous waste are liable as
arrangers. 51 Indeed, the early cases discuss generator liability as if
the statute said generator instead of arranger. 52 Among the issues that
were litigated were several that addressed whether one could be liable
as an arranger without having caused or contributed to the
contamination or the cleanup costs. 53
In United States v. Wade,54 for example, generator defendants
argued that to prove arranger liability, the Government needed to
prove that a defendant's disposal of waste at the site caused the
incurrence of cleanup costs. 55 The defendants relied heavily on the
legislative history of the bill that would have based liability on
49.

50.
51.

52.

53.
54.
55.

See Aaron Gershonowitz, Superfund "Arranger" Liability: Why Ownership of the
Hazardous Substances Matters, 59 S.C. L. REv. 147, 154 (2007) (discussing arranger
liability as "generator plus").
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Hardage, 761 F. Supp. 1501, 1511 (W.D. Okla. 1990)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3» (noting that generator liability is imposed on one who
arranged for disposal of hazardous waste); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298,
l306 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (imposing liability on parties for arranging for disposal of
hazardous substances and finding that the arranger concept includes generators);
Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1288 (D.R.I. 1986) (noting that generator liability
is imposed on one who arranged for disposal, treatment, or transport to hazardous
waste facility), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Davis, 794 F. Supp.
67,71 (D.R.I. 1992).
See Picillo, 648 F. Supp. at 1289-90 (citing many other cases for the proposition that
the first element of proving "arranger" liability is "that the generator disposed of
hazardous substances").
See, e.g., Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at l310.
577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
Id. at 1331-32 (describing the defendants' argument as raising the question of
whether traditional notions of proximate causation applied to CERCLA while the
Government argued that all that it was required to prove was that defendants' waste
was disposed of at the site).
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causation. 56 The court noted that the problem with that argument is
that the provision enacted did not contain the causation language. 57
Instead, the statute "specifies certain groups which [sic] will be held
liable.,,58 Thus, causation is not a required element of arranger
liability.
In United States v. Ward,59 the court addressed whether a generator
could be liable as an arranger when that generator did not take the
time or effort to make any arrangements regarding disposal. The
defendant argued that he sold waste oil to a party, who then made the
decision to dispose of it. 60 The court concluded that such generators
must be liable as arrangers because we should not "allow generators
of hazardous wastes to escape liability under CERCLA by closing
their eyes to the method in which their hazardous wastes were
disposed of.,,61 It must be noted, however, that while Mr. Ward did
not know how or where his waste was disposed of, he did pay
someone to "get rid of' the waste and could therefore be seen as
having arranged for disposal. 62
Generators are liable even if they did not cause the waste to be
shipped to the site that is being remediated (and therefore did not
cause the contamination). 63 In United States v. Hardage,64 for
example, the court held that the generator could be liable even if the
generator did not know that the waste was sent to the site and even if
the generator intended the waste to be disposed of elsewhere. 65 Thus,
generators of waste are liable as arrangers even if they did not
arrange to have the waste disposed of at the remediated site.
Based on the early cases, if asked whether the generator concept or
the causation concept best explained arranger liability, the answer
would have to be the generator concept. 66 The generators of a
56.
57.

58.
59.
60.
61.

62.

63.
64.
65.
66.

ld. at 1332-33.
ld. at 1334 ("The problem with the generator defendants' reliance on this report,
however, is that the liability provision ultimately enacted bears no real resemblance to
the House-passed bill to which the report refers.").
Jd.
618 F. Supp. 884 (E.O.N.C. 1985).
ld. at 895.
ld.; see also United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.O. Mo.
1985) (noting that it would be anomalous to hold liable those who designate a
destination for their waste, but not those who ignore what happens to their waste).
Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 895 (concluding that what defendant described as sale of a
product was in fact disposal ofa waste).
See United States v. Hardage, 761 F. Supp. 1501, 1511 (W.O. Okla. 1990).
761 F. Supp. 1501.
ld. at 1511.
See discussion supra Part LB.
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hazardous waste necessarily have that waste in their possession and
control at some point in time. If the waste is then disposed of, that
disposal must have been the result of some action by the generator, if
only the act of releasing it to someone for transport or disposal.
Causation, however, was not a requirement. 67 The generator was
held liable even if the waste was disposed of somewhere other than
where the generator intended and even if the generator's waste did
not cause the response costS.68
II.

UNITED STATES V. ACETO AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS
CORP.

A.

Cause but Not Generator

Aceto was very different from the generator cases because the
defendants did not generate the waste or make any waste-related
decisions. 69 The case arose out of contamination at a site owned and
operated by Aidex Corporation, a pesticide formulator. 70 Industry
practice in the pesticide industry was for pesticide manufacturers to
contract with formulators to mix the pesticide ingredients to produce
Pesticide
commercial-grade products for the manufacturer. 71
manufacturers provided Aidex with ingredients and directions for
formulation. 72
Aidex processed the ingredients and returned
commercial-grade product to the manufacturers. 73
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sought
to hold six pesticide manufacturers liable for "arranging for disposal"
of hazardous substances at the Aidex site. 74 The EPA's theory was as
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

72.

73.
74.

See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
See, e.g., id. at 1332.
See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1375-76 (8th Cir.
1989).
See id. (noting that Aidex had operated the site from 1974 until 1981, when it went
bankrupt).
ld. The court noted that that the "complaint alleges it is common practice in the
pesticide industry for manufacturers of active pesticide ingredients to contract with
formulators such as Aidex to produce a commercial grade product." Id.
ld. at 1375. There may have been some dispute as to Aidex's actual role, but the case
reached the Court of Appeals after the District Court denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss. ld. Thus, the court took the facts in the complaint as given. Id.
Id. (noting that the defendants argued that they should not be liable because they hired
Aidex to formulate, not to dispose).
Id. at 1376-78. Eight pesticide manufacturers were named as defendants, but the
complaint alleged causes of action under RCRA against all eight of them and causes
of action under CERCLA against six of them. Id.
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follows: (1) the manufacturers owned the ingredients that contained
the hazardous substances that were released or disposed of at Aidex 75
and (2) the manufacturers knew that the formulation process would
Therefore, the
result in the creation of hazardous waste. 76
manufacturers arranged for disposal of the waste disposed of by
Aidex at the Aidex site. 77
The court began its analysis by rejecting the defendants' argument
that based on the dictionary definition of arrange, the defendants
could only be liable if they intended to dispose of waste. 78 Next, the
court reviewed the legislative history of the Superfund Law and
concluded that "Congress intended that those responsible for the
problem caused by disposal of chemical poisons bear the costS.,,79
The court reasoned that this goal would be thwarted if persons could
contract away their liability.80 The defendants argued that they had
no control over Aidex operations and therefore could not have played
a role in causing the disposal. 81 The court responded to this argument
by noting that each manufacturer maintained ownership of the
chemicals, which meant they had authority to control what happened
with those chemicals and could thus have caused the disposal. 82
The causation argument addressed by the Wade court is very
different from the causation argument made by the Aceto court. The

75.

76.
77.
78.
79.

80.

81.
82.

Id. at 1378. Indeed, the complaint alleged that the defendants owned the chemicals
provided to Aidex, the work in progress, and the resulting commercial grade product.
Id.
Id. at 1379. The complaint alleged that generation of hazardous wastes was an
inherent part of the formulation process. Id.
Id. (noting that the district court relied on the principle that CERCLA should be
interpreted broadly).
Id. at 1380. The court noted that Congress intended a broad reading of "arranged for
disposal." Id.
Id. The court noted that S. 1480, the "Environmental Response Act," contained
language that would have imposed liability on all who "caused or contributed to" the
release of hazardous substances and that a Senate Committee had changed the
language to "arranged for" disposal. Id. The court noted that the reasons for the
change were "not easy to divine," but did not see the change in language as reflecting
a change in policy. Id.
Id. at 1381. The court cited New York v. Gen. Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 297
(N.D.N.Y 1984) and United States v. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842, 845
(S.D. Ill. 1984) for the proposition that CERCLA liability could not be
"circumvented" by calling a disposal a sale and that persons could not "contract
away" their liability. Id.
Id. (noting that defendants contended that they should escape liability because they
lacked control over Aidex).
Id. The court noted that "it is the authority to control the handling and disposal of
hazardous substances that is critical under the statutory scheme." Id. at 1381-82.
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Wade defendants argued that they could not be liable because neither
their activities nor their waste caused the response costs (the
CERCLA equivalent of damages). 83 In a sense, their argument was
that they were not responsible for the costs because those costs would
have been incurred even if their waste were not at the site. In Aceto,
on the other hand, the issue was who caused the contamination, not
who caused the need to clean Up.84 The court understood the phrase
"arranged for disposal" to mean "is responsible for this waste being
here.,,85 While the manufacturers may not have made any wasterelated decisions, their business activities were, to a large extent, a
cause of the creation of the contaminated site. 86
Ownership of the hazardous substances also played a role in the
Aceto decision regarding whether the arrangement was an
arrangement for disposal. 87 The court noted that ownership implied
the ability to control disposition of the chemicals, and the ability to
control is the key to arranger liability. 88 The court based its decision,
to a large extent, on the Court of Appeals decision in United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co. (NEPACCO).89
NEPACCO is a generator case. The issue was whether corporate
officers of a generator could be held liable as arrangers. 90 The
NEPACCO court held that such individuals can be held liable as
arrangers because they had authority to control the waste prior to
disposal. 91 The Aceto court reasoned that if there could be liability in
NEPACCO, where defendants did not own the hazardous substances,
then there should be liability for the Aceto defendants who did own
the hazardous substances. 92
While the Aceto court attempted to align its decision with the
generator cases such as NEPACCO, the concern addressed by the
Aceto court is fundamentally different from the concern addressed by
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

92.

United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326,1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1375.
See infra Part II.B.
See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1384.
Id. at 1379.
Id. at 1381-82 (noting that there was no transfer of ownership of the hazardous
substances).
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
Id. at 743.
Id. at 743-44. The defendants argued that only persons who owned or possessed the
hazardous substances could be liable under § 9607(a)(3), and the court rejected that
notion, concluding that persons with authority to control could be liable even without
ownership or possession. Id.
Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1382.
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NEPACCO.
In NEPACCO, the concern was that those who
controlled the waste could avoid liability by ignoring what happened
to the waste they controlled. 93 In Aceto, the defendants never
controlled the waste. 94 The court's concern was that one could set up
an elaborate set of contractual arrangements whereby one controls the
process that creates the waste and thereby causes the site to be
contaminated, but is nonetheless insulated from the liabilities related
to the generation of the waste. 95 The court was concerned that
someone could cause the problem but avoid liability by hiring
someone else to be the generator of the waste. 96
Was the use of Aidex as a formulator in Aceto a subterfuge to avoid
CERCLA liability? No. The court's concern, however, was that if
there was no liability for the Aceto_defendants, the court would have
written the blueprint for such a subterfuge. 97
B.

Appellate Court Interpretations of Aceto

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Aceto in General
Electric Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. (AAMCO) 98 as an
application of the traditional tort concept of duty. In AAMCO, the
plaintiff alleged that a group of oil companies that sold petroleum
products to service stations and had some ability to control activities
at those service stations were liable as arrangers for the disposal of
waste-petroleum products at the service stations. 99 The court rejected
that argument and distinguished the AAMCO case from Aceto
because in Aceto, the defendants controlled the process that generated
the hazardous waste, whereas the AAMCO defendants merely had
limited ability to control the process. 100 That difference, the court
reasoned, imposed a duty on the Aceto defendants with regard to
proper disposal of the waste but did not impose a duty on the
AAMCO defendants. 101

93.

NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 743-44.

Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1375, 1379.
Id. at 1381.
Id. at 1381-82.
Id. at 1382.
962 F.2d 281 (2d CiT. 1992).
99.
Id. at 283.
100. Id. at 287 (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313,
1319 (11 th CiT. 1990) (declining to hold a seller liable as an arranger when the seller
could, by use of economic power, have forced its purchasers to properly dispose of
waste)).
101. Id. at 286 (distinguishing between the obligation to control and the mere opportunity
to control).

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
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The AAMCO court further explained that Congress relied on
"traditional notions of duty and obligation" in detennining which
parties would be liable under CERCLA. 102 Thus, the obligation to
control makes one an arranger while merely having the ability to
control does not.103 The court did not specify what "traditional notion
of duty" obligated a contracting party to control the waste handling of
another party. That "obligation" appears to be unique to CERCLA
and unique to the Aceto court's view ofCERCLA. 104
Traditional concepts of duty sound very much like negligence.
Thus, the AAMCO court is showing support for the tort-based
understanding of arranger liability that grows out of the Senate bill's
attempt to base liability on causation. l05 While no one would suggest
that the Aceto defendants had a negligence-type duty to prevent
Aidex from polluting, the AAMCO court was taking the position that
the Aceto decision means that when Congress used the "arranger"
language, it intended to impose liability on anyone whose
relationship with the transaction that led to the creation of the waste
or to the contamination of the site was such that it could be seen as a
cause of the contamination. 106
The Aceto theory was further explained by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in United States v. Shell Oil CO.107 (Shel!), where oil
companies claimed that the United States government had sufficient
control over their facilities during World War II to be held liable as
arrangers for the waste generated at those facilities. 108 The oil
companies interpreted Aceto to mean that where a party has control
of a manufacturing process that generates hazardous waste, that party
has an obligation to control the disposal of the hazardous waste
generated by the process. 109
102. Id. (noting that it is the obligation to exercise control that triggers liability).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 286-87 (noting that while most courts have premised a defendant's liability
on some level of actual involvement in the disposal process, the Aceto court found the
contracting defendants liable for the waste handling of a third-party company).
105. See id. at 287 (suggesting that arranger liability must be based on some level of
causation).
106. See id. at 286 (noting that in order to assign arranger liability under CERCLA, the
defendant must either be actually involved in the disposal process or have an
obligation to arrange for or direct the disposal).
107. 281 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2002).
108. Id. at 816 (describing the degree of involvement the United States government had in
the production ofavgas during World War II).
109. Id. at 823 (the co~rt described this as the broader arranger liability theory and
discussed the applicability of Aceto).
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The Shell court accepted that definition but disagreed with the oil
companies regarding the level of control exercised by the
government. The court noted that in Aceto, the manufacturers owned
the products that Aidex was working on and controlled the process
employed by Aidex.llo That process necessarily included the
generation of hazardous waste. In such circumstances, the person
who owns the products and directs the processing has an obligation to
take responsibility for the results of that process. IliOn the other
hand, the government in Shell never owned the raw materials; it was
merely a purchaser of finished products. 112 Unlike the Aceto
defendants, it did not contract out the waste-generating step and then
try to disclaim responsibility for the waste. 113 It was not, therefore, a
cause of the contamination. 114
The AAMCO and Shell courts both understood Aceto to be based on
the causation model of arranger liability, reasoning that Congress
intended persons to be liable as arrangers if their relationship to a
transaction resulting in contamination was such that they should have
taken steps to prevent the contamination. 115 The contrast between the
cases, however, is important. The oil companies were suppliers who
had some ability to control what their purchasers did. 116 The
government in Shell, on the other hand, was a purchaser who had
some element of control over what its supplier did.117 In Aceto, the
defendants were both the suppliers of raw materials and the
purchasers of the finished product. 118 Possibly, being on both sides of
the transaction and controlling what happens in between by providing
specifications for the processing includes the level of control that
amounts to control of the waste. 119

110. ld. (noting that the government never owned any of the raw materials).
111. ld.
112. ld. (following through with the attempted Aceto analogy, the court said that the
government was more like a purchaser of pesticides than a pesticide manufacturer).
113. ld. (noting that the government did not "contract out . . . a crucial and wasteproducing intermediate step in the manufacturing process, and then seek to disclaim
responsibility").
114. See id. at 824-25.
115. See id. at 825; Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286 (2d
Cir. 1992).
116. AAMCO, 962 F.2d at 287.
117. Shell, 281 F.3d at 816-17.
118. See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1375 (8th Cir. 1989).
119. Compare Shell, 281 F.3d at 823, 826 (holding that a mere purchaser possessing the
ability to control some supplier conduct was not an arranger), and AAMCO, 962 F.2d
at 287-88 (holding that mere suppliers possessing the ability to control some
purchaser conduct were not arrangers), with Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1375, 1384 (holding
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The Sixth Circuit applied the Aceto theory in GenCorp, Inc. v. Olin
Corp.,120 where the defendant appeared to be on both sides of the
transaction. 121 The contamination was the result of a joint venture
between Olin and GenCorp.122 The facility was jointly operated, and
when Olin was held liable for waste sent off-site, it sued GenCorp
and claimed that GenCorp was liable for the same waste as an
arranger. 123
The Sixth Circuit cited Aceto for the idea that courts should look
beyond the parties' characterization of the transaction to see if the
transaction was, in fact, an arrangement for disposal. 124 The court
recognized that intent is important because the word arrange means
to make a plan. 125 GenCorp claimed it never owned or possessed the
waste nor made any decisions regarding arrangement for disposal. 126
The court found those facts not necessarily relevant because GenCorp
did knowingly participate in a transaction that included an
arrangement for disposal. 127 The court did not examine whether
GenCorp provided raw materials, purchased output, or controlled the
process. None of that was necessary because GenCorp operated the
facility that generated the waste. 128 The court's focus was on how to
characterize the transaction-whether it was a sale of a product or a

120.
121.
122.
123.

124.
125.
126.
127.

128.

that a finn supplying raw materials, receiving finished product, and controlling some
aspects of processing was an arranger).
390 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 438-39.
Id. at 438--40.
Id. at 438--41. The relationship between the parties was more complex than in Aceto
because in addition to joint ownership and operation of the facility, the purpose of the
facility was to produce toluene di-isocyanate, which was a critical ingredient in
GenCorp's manufacture of urethane. Compare id. at 438-39 (noting the joint
operation and needs of urethane manufacture), with Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1375 (noting
that the end product was sold to consumers, not used in the defendants' facilities).
Thus, GenCorp was funding the manufacture of a product it would purchase from the
facility for use of its facilities. See GenCorp, 390 F.3d at 438.
GenCorp, 390 F.3d at 446 (noting that looking beyond the parties' characterization of
the transaction required a fact-driven inquiry).
Id. at 445--46 (quoting Webster's New College Dictionary for its definition of
arrange).
Id. at 446.
Id. (noting that arrange for disposal did not require an intent to dispose of waste; it
required an intent to engage in a transaction that included the disposal of hazardous
substances).
Id. at 439.
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transaction that included disposal. 129 If the transaction included the
generation and disposal of hazardous waste, each party to that
transaction arranged for disposal. 130
The Eleventh Circuit gave limited approval to the Aceto theory in
South Florida Water Management. District v. Montalvo. 131 The issue
in Montalvo was whether farmers and ranchers who contracted for
the aerial spraying of pesticides and herbicides on their properties
could be liable as arrangers for the contamination at the air strip
owned by the party who did the spraying.132 The sprayers tried to
analogize their case to Aceto. 133 The farmers owned the pesticides
and knew that spillage was a necessary part of the application
process. 134 If not for the process required by the farmers, there would
have been no contamination. 135 Thus, the farmers were, effectively,
the cause ofthe contamination. 136
The court rejected that analogy, concluding that the relationship
between the sprayers and the farmers bore little resemblance to
Aceto. 137 In Aceto, the manufacturers provided the chemicals,
specified what chemicals to mix, and retained ownership of the
chemicals throughout. 138 From that, the court noted that "it was
possible to infer that the manufacturers exercised some control over
the formulator's mixing process." 139 Additionally, while in Aceto the

129. Id. at 446 (listing numerous facts that led the district court to correctly conclude that
the transaction GenCorp participated in was not merely the purchase of a product but
also included preparations for waste disposal).
130. See id.
131. 84 F.3d 402, 408 n.9 (II th Cir. 1996) (noting that reference to Aceto in prior Eleventh
Circuit decisions "cannot be interpreted as a wholesale adoption of Aceto as the law of
this circuit").
132. Id. at 404-06. The Government sued the sprayers and the sprayers brought a thirdparty action against the farmers. Id. The theory underlying the third-party complaint
was that the sprayers' use and handling of hazardous substances was solely for the
benefit of the farmers and the farmers knew that hazardous waste was a byproduct of
the sprayers' activities. Id. Therefore, the farmers arranged for disposal of waste. Id.
133. Id. at 408 (noting that the sprayers argued that the farmers controlled the spraying).
134. Id. at 407.
135. Id. at 409.
136. ld. at 407 (assessing the sprayers' argument that the farmers should be liable on a
common-law agency theory). The court cited Aceto for the proposition that commonlaw agency theory can be relevant to determining who is an arranger but concluded
that, in this case, the sprayers were not the agents of the farmers for purposes of waste
disposal. Id. at 407 n.8.
137. ld. at 407--08 (noting several factual distinctions between the case at bar and Aceto).
138. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1375 (8th Cir. 1989).
139. Montalvo, 84 F.3d at 408 (citing Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381-82) (noting that the key
difference is that in Aceto it was possible to infer that the manufacturers exercised
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mIxmg process '''inherently' involved the creation of hazardous
waste," the service contracted for by the farmers did not necessarily
include the creation of hazardous wastes. 140 While the sprayers
alleged that waste was a necessary part of the process, the court noted
that there was no reason to believe the farmers knew this. 141 The
court recognized the need to look beyond the way the parties had
characterized their transaction to determine whether the facts indicate
an arrangement for disposal. 142 In this case, however, the facts
indicate that the farmers had merely contracted for a service. 143
The GenCorp and Montalvo courts understood Aceto differently
than the AAMCO and Shell courts did. The AAMCO and Shell courts
saw Aceto as representing the concept that one's relationship to the
transaction that created the waste or the contamination can impose an
obligation or responsibility regarding waste disposal. 144 In GenCorp
and Montalvo, on the other hand, Aceto stands for the proposition that
a court must look beyond the parties' characterization of the
transaction to determine the true intent of the transaction-regardless
of what the parties say, was this transaction an arrangement for
disposal of hazardous waste? 145
Thus, depending on what circuit you are in, Aceto-type liability
means (1) arranger liability based on being party to the type of
transaction that would impose a duty to assure that waste resulting
from the transaction is taken care of properly or (2) arranger liability
based on having been a party to a transaction that, regardless of how
the parties characterize the transaction, was, in fact, an arrangement
for the disposal of hazardous waste.
If we compare these descriptions of Aceto we see that they directly
address whether Congress intended arranger liability to be based

140.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

some control of the fonnulator's process, while that control was not present in this
case).
Jd. The court dealt with this issue in two ways. First, the court stated that spraying
"does not obviously involve the creation and disposal of hazardous waste." Id. Then,
noting that plaintiffs had alleged that creation of hazardous waste was inherent in the
process and on a motion to dismiss; the court was to accept the facts as pled, the court
stated that the sprayers never alleged that the fanners knew this. Id. at 407-08.
Id. at 408-09 (citing Aceto for the importance of this knowledge).
Id. at 408 n.9 (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313,
1318 (lith Cir. 1990)).
Id. at 408-09.
See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 281 F.3d 812, 822 (9th Cir. 2002); Gen. Elec. Co.
v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286-87 (2d CiT. 1992).
See GenCorp, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 390 F.3d 433, 446 (6th CiT. 2004); Montalvo, 84
F.3d at 408 n.9.
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primarily on causation or whether Congress intended it to be based
primarily on the generator concept. 146 The Second Circuit's view
based on duty takes the position that even though Congress did not
include causation language, it intended essentially a tort-based
concept. 147 The Sixth Circuit's rule is essentially based on generator
liability.148 Regardless of how the parties characterize their position,
was the defendant, in fact, someone whose status was that of a
generator?
The question of how to characterize the transaction is further
developed in the line of cases that address whether the seller of a
useful product can have arranger liability.
III. SALE OF A USEFUL PRODUCT AS A DEFENSE TO
ARRANGER LIABILITY
A number of courts have recognized a defense to arranger liability
where the defendant can successfully argue that it was not the
generator of waste who arranged for its disposal or treatment but
instead the seller of a product that contained hazardous substances,
which were later disposed of or released by someone else. In
Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 149 the Second Circuit explained
why sellers of useful hazardous substances do not have arranger
liability. Glaxo, upon closing a facility, sold chemical reactants used
in its facility to Freeman Industries, Inc. (FII) for use in FII's
business. ISO FH used some of the· chemicals in its business, stored
some of them, and sold some of them. The stored chemicals became
the source of a remedial action by the EPA at the FII facility, and the
EPA sued Glaxo and claimed Glaxo had arranged for disposal of its
chemicals at the FH facility. 151 Glaxo's defense was that it merely
sold the chemicals. 152
After going through the long list of cases holding that one cannot
circumvent the Superfund Law by characterizing disposal as a sale,153

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Compare Shell, 281 F.3d at 822, and AAMCO, 962 F.2d at 286-87, with GenCorp,
390 F.3d at 446, and Montalvo, 84 F.3d at 408.
See AAMCO, 962 F.2d at 286.
See GenCorp, 390 F.3d at 445-46.
189 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 1999).
ld. at 162. Mr. Freeman inspected the chemicals and purchased them "both for use in
the Freeman laboratories and for resale." ld.
ld at 163. Glaxo moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion. ld.
ld. at 164 (noting that "it is uncontroverted" that Glaxo merely sold chemicals).
ld. (citing Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., 142 F.3d
769 (4th Cir. 1998); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313
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the court noted that Glaxo had sold valuable products to FII for use or
resale. These were virgin chemicals, not waste. 154 Arrangement for
disposal requires the presence of waste. 155 Therefore, Glaxo did not
arrange for disposal at the FII facility. 156
In Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton
R.R.,157 the Fourth Circuit provided further analysis of how to
determine whether a transaction is a "sale" or an arrangement for
disposal.
The court explained that to determine "whether a
transaction was for the discard of hazardous substances or for the sale
of valuable materials," the key factors to examine are the intent of the
parties and the usefulness of the product. 158
The transaction in Pneumo was the sale of used bearings to be
processed into new bearings.159 The processing generated waste, but
the court found that the essence of the transaction was payment in
exchange for bearings, not an attempt to dispose of unwanted
metal. 160 Thus, the seller did not arrange for disposal.
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Cello-Foil Products, Inc., 161
addressed a more complex transaction in which there were elements
of both the sale of a useful product and disposal of waste. 162 The
court recognized that if the material at issue (the subject of the
transaction) is waste, the transaction is an arrangement for disposal;

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

159.

160.

16L
162.

(11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir.
1989)).
Id.
Id. ("Because the definition of 'disposal' refers to 'waste,' only transactions that
involve 'waste' constitute arrangements for disposal .... ").
Id.
142 F.3d 769 (4th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 775 (noting that whether the materials were to be reused in their entirety played
a role in determining intent and the value of the goods sold plays a role in determining
whether the materials are, in fact, waste).
Id. at 772-73 (noting that the "conversion agreements" provided that used journal
bearings were shipped to Pneumo's foundry for processing and the seller of the used
bearings received a credit against the purchase price of new bearings based on the
weight of the bearings).
Id. at 775 (citing several cases that examined what was being sold as the means to
determine the intent of the parties and noting that the waste generated by the
reclamation of the bearings was incidental to the reclamation of the bearings and not
the essence of the transaction).
100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1230. The defendants were purchasers of solvents in a transaction that was the
sale of a useful product, but the transaction required the defendants to return the used
drums to the seller. Id. This return of the used drums with some waste residue was
alleged to be the arrangement for disposal. Id.
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and conversely, if the material at issue is a useful product, the
transaction is not arrangement for disposal. 163
In Cello-Foil, the defendants were purchasers of solvents. 164 The
contract of sale provided that Thomas Solvents, the seller, would
deliver solvents in reusable drums, and the price included a drum
deposit. 165 The purchasers used the solvents and returned the drums
to Thomas, who cleaned and reused the drums. 166 The Government
argued that the arrangement was impliedly an arrangement for
disposal of waste because the drums that were returned contained
some solvent residue, which was the source of the contamination at
the Thomas facility.167 The defendants argued that they could not be
liable because they lacked the intent to dispose of the waste. 168
The court began its analysis by noting that the legislation does not
define the phrase "arrange for."169 The court noted that the Seventh
Circuit had defined "arrange for" to include an element of intent in
Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 170 where Judge Posner
reasoned that the phrase "arrange for disposal" contemplates a case in
which a person wants to get rid of something.171 Thus, if the
defendant did not intend to get rid of a hazardous substance, there has
been no arrangement for disposal. 172 The Cello-Foil court expanded
on this concept, concluding that intent is a requirement because
arrangement embraces concepts similar to contract and agreement. 173
To arrange means to "'make preparations' or 'plan,'" both of which
are actions that include an intent requirement. 174 Thus, what the
163. Id. at 1232 (citing AM Int'!, Inc. v. Int'I Forging Equip. Corp., 982 F.2d 989, 999 (6th
Cir. 1993)).
164. Id. at 1230 (describing the tenns ofthe defendants' purchase of solvents).
165. Id. When purchasers returned the used drums and purchased more solvent, the
deposit was credited against the purchase price. Id.
166. Id. (noting that the contents of the returned drums varied, with some as empty as
possible and some containing as much as fifteen gallons of solvent).
167. Id. (noting that this arrangement resulted in the contamination at issue whereby
reusable drums were used and returned to the seller with some remaining solvent that
the seller disposed of or released to the environment).
168. Id.
169. Id.at1231.
170. 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993).
17l. Id. at 751 (concluding that Detrex arranged for transport of hazardous substances but
did not arrange for them to spill).
172. See id.
173. 100 F.3d at 1231 (noting that the statute connects arranged for disposal with the
phrase "by contract, agreement, or otherwise").
174. Id. at 1232 (quoting Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751) (noting that an intent requirement is not
inconsistent with strict liability because intent only determines whether the person is a
potentially responsible party, and ifhe or she is, then strict liability applies).
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parties intended can determine how the transaction will be
characterized. 175
To determine what the parties intended, courts look to the totality
of the circumstances, not to how the parties characterize their
transaction. 176 Thus, in Cello-Foil, the court noted that by leaving
solvents in the drums, which the defendants knew Thomas would
take away and dispose of, one could infer the intent to dispose of
those solvents. 177 In Amcast, on the other hand, the court found that
when a seller of solvents gives the solvents to a transporter to deliver
to a user, the seller has not arranged for disposal of solvent
accidentally spilled by the transporter. 178 The transaction was a sale
of a useful product and did not include intent to dispose of
anything. 179
The key difference between Amcast and Cello-Foil is what was
being transferred. In Cello-Foil, the defendant transferred waste, and
based on that, the court found that the transaction could be considered
an arrangement for disposal. 180 In Amcast, on the other hand, the
material was not waste, and therefore, the transaction was not an
arrangement for disposal.I 81 The principle underlying both cases is
that if the subject matter of the transaction is waste, the transaction is
more likely to be seen as an arrangement for disposal. 182
IV. BURLINGTON NORTHERN & SANTA FE RAILWAY Co. V
UNITED STATES

A.

The Court's Decision

Burlington Northern is the first. Supreme Court decision addressing
the definition of "arrange for disposal." The case arose out of
contamination at a site owned and operated by Brown & Bryant, Inc.

175. ld. at 1233-34 (concluding that defendants are not liable under § 107(a)(3) of
CERCLA without a showing that they intended to dispose of hazardous substances).
176. See, e.g., id. at 1232-34.
177. Jd. at 1233-34 (denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment because issues
of fact existed regarding whether there was an intent to dispose of waste).
178. Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751.
179. Jd.
180. Cella-Foil, 100 F.3d at 1233-34.
181. Amcast, 2 F.3d at 75l.
182. Compare Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d at 1233-34 (stating that the issue of whether waste was
involved was relevant to liability), with Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751 (stating that if a shipper
arranges for the delivery of a useful product, the shipper cannot be held liable under
CERCLA for a carrier's mishap).
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(B&B), a small chemical distributor. 183 Shell sold a number of
products to B&B, including pesticides known as D-D and
Nemagon. 184 Various spills and releases at the B&B site resulted in
contamination of the soil and groundwater. 185 The State of California
and EPA undertook remedial efforts at the site,186 and after B&B
went out of business, the State named Shell and Burlington Northern
as responsible parties. 187 Shell was alleged to have arranger liability
because chemicals it sold to B&B were allegedly spilled on
delivery. 188 The Government alleged that Burlington Northern was
liable as an owner because a portion of the B&B facility was on
property B&B leased from Burlington Northern. 189
The case could be seen as the intersection between the sale of a
useful product cases and the Aceto line of cases. Shell argued that it
was merely selling a useful product and no court has ever held that
sale of a useful product is an arrangement for disposal of hazardous
substances. 19o The Government, on the other hand, argued that when
Shell sold its products, it knew that the system of delivery it had set
up always included some spillage upon delivery. 191 That knowledge,
the Government argued, plus Shell's control of the delivery process
meant that what Shell called merely a sale was, in fact, an
arrangement for the disposal of hazardous substances. 192
The district court held Shell liable as an arranger and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 193 The Court of Appeals noted
183. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1874-75 (2009).
B&B had begun operations in 1960 on an approximately 3.8 acre parcel. Jd. at 1874.
B&B stored chemicals on-site and applied them to customers' farms. Id. at 1875.
184. Id. at 1875 (noting that because D-D was corrosive, it resulted in numerous tank
failures and spills).
185.
186.

Id.
Id. at 1875-76.

188.
189.

Id.
Jd. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Burlington Northern was jointly and
severally liable for all of the cleanup costs even though it did not contribute to the
contamination and it only owned a portion of the site for a portion of the time the site
operated. Id. at 1877. The court reversed, holding that CERCLA liability is not joint
and several where, as here, there is some reasonable basis for allocating the costs. Id.
at 1882-83.
Reply Brief of Petitioner at 14, Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. 1870 (No. 07-1607).
Brief for the United States at 12, Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. 1870 (No. 07-1607).
Id. at 13.
United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918,952 (9th Cir. 2008)
(amended opinion), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1870.

The California Department of Toxic Substances Control began
investigating the site in 1983. Id. at 1875. The site was added to the National
Priorities List in 1989. Id. at 1876.
187. Id. at 1876.

190.
191.
192.

193.
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that although Shell was not a "traditional" arranger, in the sense that
it did not transact with B&B to dispose of hazardous waste, it could
be held liable under the "broader" arranger theory, where disposal is
not the goal of the transaction but is a foreseeable byproduct. 194 The
court discussed whether arranger liability needed to be purposeful
and concluded that it did not because "disposal" is defined in
CERCLA to include activities such as leaking that could occur
accidentally.195 The court also noted that Shell had sent directions for
the delivery process in an attempt to limit the amount of spillage. 196
These directions were seen by the court as an element of Shell's
control of the delivery process. 197
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Shell was not liable as
an arranger. 198 The Court began its analysis of the arranger issue by
looking to the statute, noting that the language of CERCLA makes
clear that one who enters a transaction "for the sole purpose of
discarding" a hazardous substance, "arrange[s] for disposal.,,199 At
the same time, if one merely sells a useful product and the purchaser,
"unbeknownst to the seller, disposed of the product," the seller has
not arranged for disposal. 200 The intermediate cases, the Court stated,
are more difficult. 201 Two intermediate cases mentioned by the Court
are (1) where the seller has some knowledge of the buyer's planned
disposal and (2) where the seller's motive for sale of the substance is
less than clear. 202 In such cases, courts require "a fact-intensive
inquiry that looks beyond the parties' characterization of the
transaction ... to discern whether the arrangement was one Congress
intended to fall within the scope of CERCLA's strict-liability

194. ld. at 948-49 (defining "broader" arranger liability as cases in which a person does
not contract directly for disposal but engages in a transaction that indirectly results in
the disposal of hazardous substances).
195. ld. at 949 (discussing the definition of disposal, which includes "leaking," which can
occur accidentally).
196. Id. at 950-51 (stating that Shell's change of its delivery practices to reduce spillage
showed that it knew of the spillage and that it had some control).
197. Id.
198. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1880 (2009).
199. Jd. at 1878.
200. Id. (citing Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1999)).
201. Id. at 1879.
202. ld.
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provisions."z03 The cases cited by the Court indicate that the issue is
whether the transaction is, in essence, a sale or a disposal. Z04
The Court cautioned against taking that "fact-intensive inquiry"
beyond the limits of the statute. Z05 Because Congress did not define
arrange for disposal, the Court looked to the common understanding
of the phrase. Z06 For the common understanding of the word arrange,
the Court looked to the Merriam-Webster College Dictionary, which
defined arrange as "to make preparations for: plan; ... to bring about
an agreement or understanding conceming."z07 Based on this, the
Court concluded that an entity "may qualify as an arranger under
§ 9607(a)(3) when it takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous
substance. ,,208
The Government argued that because disposal is defined broadly to
include unintentional acts such as spilling and leaking, one can
arrange for disposal unintentionally.209 The Government further
argued that Shell could be liable as an arranger because it sold its
product with the knowledge that some product will spill and result in
disposal. zlO The Court rejected both of these arguments. 2lI
The Court recognized that there may be circumstances where
knowledge that the product will be spilled or disposed of will show
intent to dispose of hazardous substances. 212 However, knowledge
alone does not create such an inference. 213 To be liable, the Court
203. ld.
204. ld. (citing Freeman, 189 F.3d at 164; Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville
& Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 775 (4th Cir. 1998). All of the cases cited could be
seen as raising the defense of sale of a useful product. See, e.g., id.
205. ld. This is probably a reference to the cases that focus on whether the defendant has
some element of responsibility for the waste even though one cannot say that they
made an arrangement for disposal.
206. ld.
207. ld. The Court stated that when a statute does not define a concept, courts are to give
the concept its ordinary meaning. ld. (citing Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville &
Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846,850 (2009); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42
(1979)).
208. ld. (noting that state of mind plays an indispensible role in determining whether a
party has arranged for disposal of hazardous substances).
209. ld. (discussing the definition of "disposal").
210. ld. (quoting the portion of the Government's brief that argued that Shell's knowledge
of the spills made Shell liable as an arranger).
211. ld. at 1880.
212. ld. (noting that knowledge alone, however, is never sufficient to prove that defendant
planned for disposal).
213. ld. (noting that although there may be circumstances in which knowledge of spills
may lead to an inference that the transaction is an arrangement for disposal,
knowledge alone is insufficient).
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stated, "Shell must have entered into the sale of D-D with the
intention that at least a portion of the product be disposed of during
the transfer process.,,214 Here, however, Shell took steps to prevent
such spills. 215 The spills could not, therefore, have been intended by
Shell. 216
B.

Three Questions About Burlington Northern

To understand the Supreme Court's decision, we need to closely
examine three places where the Court appears to have used imprecise
or uncertain language. First, the Court stated that "an entity may
qualify as an arranger under § 9607(3) when it takes intentional steps
to dispose of a hazardous substance.,,217 The use of the word may is
puzzling because based on other portions of the decision, it would
seem that anyone who takes intentional steps to dispose of a
hazardous substance has necessarily arranged for disposal. 218 Thus,
we need to examine the decision to determine whether the Court's
position is that there are cases in which a person takes intentional
steps to dispose of a hazardous substance and does not qualify as an
arranger or whether the Court is telling us that intentional steps to
dispose are not the only way to arrange for disposal.
Second, the Court noted "that in some instances an entity's
knowledge that its product will be leaked, spilled, dumped, or
otherwise discarded may provide evidence of the entity's intent to
dispose.,,219 What cases are those-could this be a reference to the
Aceto scenario?
Third, the Court sometimes used the phrase "intent to dispose" and
sometimes it used the phrase "intentional steps to dispose.,,22o Are
those two different things? This distinction could be crucial because
while intent is clearly required, the defendants in Aceto intentionally
participated in a transaction that included disposal, but they did not
have intent to dispose. 221

214. Id. (noting that the facts of this case did not support such a conclusion).
215. Id. (noting that Shell had provided safety manuals and required adequate storage in an
attempt to reduce or prevent spillage).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1879 (emphasis added) (noting that inquiry into state of mind is indispensible).
218. Id. at 1878 (stating that "[i]t is plain from the language of the statute" that if one
enters into a transaction for the "sole purpose of discarding a used ... hazardous
substance," liability would attach).
219. Id. at 1880.
220. See, e.g., id. at 1879-80.
221. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir. 1989).
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What Did the Court Mean by "May Qualify"?

Did the Court use the phrase "may qualify" to indicate that there
are cases where the defendant took "intentional steps to dispose of a
hazardous substance" but did not incur arranger liability?222 One
could view Pneuma and Cello-Foil as such cases. 223 In both cases,
the transaction included sale of a useful product and some waste
material that was expected to be discarded. 224 Thus, one could view
each transaction as one that included intentional steps to dispose of a
hazardous substance. In each case, however, the courts looked to the
essence of the transaction and asked what did the seller really
intend-was this transaction primarily about getting rid of waste, or
was it primarily about selling something the buyer intended to use?225
If the latter, there is no arranger liability. 226
The Burlington Northern Court cited both cases favorably in its
discussion of how to determine whether a defendant is liable as an
arranger. 227 Thus, it could be that when the Court said that an entity
"may qualify as an arranger. . . when it takes intentional steps to
dispose of a hazardous substance," it meant to inform us that
intentional steps to dispose are not sufficient to create liability. 228 A
court must look to all the circumstances and determine whether the
essence of the transaction was disposal. 229 If so, the intentional steps
will incur liability, and if not, the intentional steps will not incur
liability. 230
A second possible understanding of the Court's use of the phrase
"may qualify" instead of "does qualify," addresses whether liability
arises where the hazardous substance disposed of is not a waste. 231 It
is important to note that while most of CERCLA addresses the
release of hazardous substances to the environment, § 9607(3) may
be limited to hazardous waste.232 Section 9607(3) incorporates the
definition of disposal, which means the "discharge, deposit, [or]

222. Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1879.
223. Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769 (4th
Cir. 1998); United States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1996).
224. Pneuma, 142 F.3d at 772-73; Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d at 1229-30.
225. Pneuma, 142 F.3d at 775-76; Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d at 1231-34.
226. See Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746,751 (7th Cir. 1993).
227. Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1878-79.
228. Id. at 1879.
229. See id. at 1878-79.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 1879.
232. See 42 V.S.c. §§ 6903(3),9601(29), 9607(a)(3) (2006).
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injection" of any "hazardous waste."m Indeed, in Burlington
Northern, Shell argued that it could not have liability because the
product that was spilled or released was not a hazardous waste. 234
The Court does not seem to have accepted this distinction between
hazardous substance and hazardous waste. Indeed, the Court used the
broader term hazardous substances throughout its decision. 235 Thus,
by implication, the Court rejected Shell's argument that there could
be no liability unless the subject matter of the transaction was a
hazardous waste. 236 The decisive factor, the Court explained, is not
what the transaction is about (i.e., did the transaction involve waste),
but what the parties intended when they engaged in the transaction. 237
The Court made clear that the subject matter of the transaction will
playa role in understanding the intent of the parties. 238 That is, waste
can indicate intent to dispose. 239 However, the subject matter is a
factor in determining what the parties intended; intent is not the
means of determining the subject matter of the transaction. 240
A third possible understanding of the Court's use of "may" is that
the Court was informing us that intentional steps to dispose are not
necessary to produce arranger liability. Think back to the early
generator cases. 241 In United States v. Ward,242 for example, there
was no evidence that the defendant made any arrangement for
disposal. 243 The court nevertheless found liability because the
defendant was the generator of the waste and a party should not be
able to escape liability by closing its eyes to what happens to its
233. See id.
234. Brief for Petitioner at 22, Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. 1870 (No. 07-1607) (arguing that
the correct understanding of "arranged for disposal" must incorporate the statutory
definition of disposal, and that 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) ties disposal to hazardous waste).
235. Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1878-79 (where the phrase "hazardous substances"
appears at least seven times and hazardous waste is discussed only in responding to
the Government's argument that disposal required hazardous waste).
236. The Court did not respond directly to Shell's argument, but the Court's consistent use
of "substances" where it could have used "waste" implies that waste is not a
requirement for liability. See id. at 1878-80.
237. Id. at 1880 (stating that for there to be liability, Shell must have entered into the
transaction with the intention that some of the product be disposed of during the
transfer process).
238. See id.
239. See id. (discussing what facts may indicate an intent to dispose).
240. See id. (explaining that knowledge that a product will be leaked may provide evidence
of intent to dispose).
241. See discussion supra Part I.B.
242. 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C. 1985); see also discussion supra Part LB.
243. Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 895.
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waste. 244 The Burlington Northern Court's use of the word may
could mean, then, that intentional steps are not the only way to incur
arranger liability.
Does the Court's reasoning that arranger liability includes an intent
element mean that one who negligently handles hazardous waste and
thus causes a release to the environment cannot be liable as an
arranger? The policies underlying the Ward decision suggest the
answer is no.245 There are numerous generator cases in which the
generator mishandled the waste and that mishandling was seen as an
arrangement for disposal. 246 If the Court intended such a change in
the law, the Court should have been explicit about it.
That explains why the Court talked about "intentional steps to
dispose" as opposed to intent to dispose 247-the Court was in fact
being precise. Any person who disposes of hazardous waste has
arranged for disposal. That issue was not before the Court; the issue
before the Court was a transaction where the defendant was removed
from the generation and disposal of waste. 248 In such a case, the
defendant's intent to take steps toward disposal is necessary-the key
being the purpose of the steps the defendant took. 249
2.

Why Did the Court Say "In Some Instances"?

The Court stated that "in some instances," knowledge that the
product being sold will be discarded may provide evidence of the
entity's intent to dispose of its hazardous wastes. 250 The Court cited
nothing for that proposition, thus leaving the reader with little
evidence of what those instances are. 251 This would have been an
appropriate place for citing Aceto or other cases in that line, but the
Court chose not to do so. In each of those cases, the defendant knew

244. ld.
245. See id.
246. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 169 (4th Cir. 1988) (reasoning
that the United States has made out a prima facie case if it shows that the generator's
waste was shipped to the site); United States v. Conso!. Rail Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1461,
1469 (D. De!. 1990) (reasoning that authority to make waste-related decisions is
sufficient to impose generator liability); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1291-92
(D.R.I. 1986) (reasoning that generators are liable regardless of whether they carefully
determined what would happen to the waste).
247. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870,1879 (2009).
248. ld.
249. See id. at 1879-80.
250. ld. at 1880.
251. See id.
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that the transaction would generate hazardous waste. 252 The Court,
however, continued with a discussion of Shell's activities. 253 Shell
took steps to reduce the likelihood that there would be spills. This
showed Shell's knowledge of the disposal. 254 Unlike the court of
appeals, who saw this as rather damning evidence (Shell clearly knew
that there would be spills and everyone intends the known or
expected consequences of their actions), the Court saw this as
evidence that Shell did not intend spills to occur. 255 Thus, the phrase
"in some instances" is meant as a limitation, a rejection of those
decisions that saw knowledge that disposal would occur as always
implying an arrangement for disposal.
There is a potentially significant difference between Shell's
knowledge that some spills would occur and Aceto's knowledge that
hazardous waste would be generated by the transaction. 256 Shell's
knowledge of accidental spills of virgin product does not necessarily
indicate intent to dispose of that product. Knowledge that a
transaction will generate hazardous waste, however, is a greater
indicator of an intent to dispose of waste, because hazardous waste
must be disposed of. By only discussing spills of virgin product, as
opposed to generation of waste, the Court has left open the possibility
that Aceto-type cases are the "some instances" referred to by the
Court. 257
The Court's message, then, is that knowledge that there will be
spills or that material will be discarded is not sufficient to create
liability. 258 Knowledge is some evidence, but the goal of the inquiry
is to determine the defendant's intent when it entered the transaction.
If the intent was disposal, then the transaction is an arrangement for
disposal. 259
252. See, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1381 (8th Cir.
1989).
253. Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1880.
254. ld.
255. ld. at 1877, 1880.
256. Compare id. at 1880 (holding that Shell's awareness of some potential spillage was
insufficient evidence to infer that Shell intended such spills to occur), with Aceto, 872
F.2d at 1382 (affirming the imposition of liability on defendants who owned the
hazardous substances at issue and retained ultimate authority over the work in
progress).
257. See Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1880.
258. See id. ("[K]nowledge alone is insufficient to prove than an entity 'planned for' the
disposal .... ").
259. See id. (noting that an entity can be considered an arranger "when it takes intentional
steps to dispose of a hazardous substance").
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Why Did the Court Say "Steps to Dispose" as Opposed to
"Intent to Dispose"?

While it is clear that arrange includes an element of intent, the
Court could have been more precise in defining what intent is
required. The Court moves back and forth between intent to dispose
and intent to take steps to dispose. 26o That distinction is crucial
because while it is difficult to say that Shell intended to dispose of
hazardous substances at B&B, it is not so implausible to say that
Shell intentionally took steps that resulted in a disposal at B&B.
As a first step in understanding what intent the Court referred to,
the Court made it clear that not all arrangements that result in
disposal are arrangements for disposal that bring § 9607(3)
liability. 261 The Court cited two cases for the proposition that courts
must look beyond how the parties characterize their transaction to
determine "whether the arrangement was one Congress intended to
fall within the scope of CERCLA's strict liability provisions":
Freeman and Pneumo. 262 In both cases, the courts looked to the
intent of the parties to determine whether the arrangement was one
that should be subject to liability. 263 In both cases, the courts
examined what was being transferred as a key to understanding the
intent of the parties. 264 If the item was waste, the arrangement would
be an arrangement for disposal. 265 If the subject of the transaction
was a useful product, no liability could attach. 266
These cases suggest that the Court was being precise in requiring
intent to take steps toward disposal. Intent to dispose would be
sufficient, but is not necessary. If the intent was not disposal, but
instead the intent was to engage in a transaction that the court finds
(by examining all of the circumstances) to be essentially a disposal,
that would also bring liability. 267

260. See, e.g., id. at 1879-80.
261. See id. at 1878.
262. Id. at 1879 (citing Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir.
1999); Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769,
775 (4th Cir. 1998)).
263. Freeman, 189 F.3d at 164; Pneuma, 142 F.3d at 775.
264. Freeman, 189 F.3d at 164; Pneuma, 142 F.3d at 775.
265. See Freeman, 189 F.3d at 164 (noting that the chemicals in question were not waste at
the time of the transaction); Pneuma, 142 F.3d at 775-76 (noting that the used wheel
bearings were a "valuable product").
266. See Freeman, 189 F.3d at 164; Pneuma, 142 F.3d at 775-76.
267. Freeman, 189 F .3d at 164 (discussing the circumstances that courts will consider in
determining whether a transaction constitutes a disposal); Pneuma, 142 F.3d at 775
(providing the factors courts apply to determine whether a transaction is for disposal).
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The Court's response to the Government's argument about disposal
supports the conclusion that intent to take steps toward disposal is the
key. The Government argued that disposal can occur accidentally,
and therefore, one can arrange for disposal accidentally.268 The Court
responded by focusing on the "ultimate purpose of the
arrangement.,,269 The question is not what happened, but what was
"planned for.,,270 Thus, the Court was being precise in addressing the
nature of the arrangement (i.e. was it an intentional step toward
disposal) rather than focusing on what actually occurred (i.e. was
there a disposal). If the nature of the arrangement is one the court
deems to be a disposal, the defendant will have liability. 271
C.

Burlington Northern: Generator or Cause?

Does the Burlington Northern Court adopt the view of arranger
liability that is built on generator liability, the view based on
causation, or something else? At first glance, one would have to say
something else.
The Court examined the word arrange and
concluded that it contains a required element of intent.272 Neither
generator liability, nor causation liability, contain a required element
of intent. 273
A good case can be made that the generator theory, or significant
portions of that theory, survived because the Court indicated that the
subject matter of the transaction is a major factor in determining the
real intent of the transaction. 274 CERCLA adopts the RCRA
definition of hazardous waste. 275 A major component of that
definition is that waste is something to be discarded. 276 It may be that
regardless of what one claims to be doing, any transaction the subject
of which is an item to be discarded is an arrangement for disposaL
This is the core of the generator theory-every generator is an
268. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1880 (2009).
269. Id.
270. See id. at 1880.
271. See id. at 1878-80.
272. Id. at 1879.
273. Compare supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of
generator liability under RCRA), with supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text
(discussing the imposition of strict liability on those who cause contamination).
274. See Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1880.
275. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2006) (defining "hazardous substance" in CERCLA
in part by reference to RCRA's characterization of hazardous waste), and 42 U.S.C. §
6921(b)(I) (linking RCRA's characterization of hazardous waste to the definition of
"hazardous waste"), with 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (2006) (defining "hazardous waste").
276. See § 6903(5).
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arranger because the only thing one can do with hazardous waste is
arrange for its disposaL 277
Causation theory, on the other hand, has a hard time surviving this
decision. Shell's method of delivery was the cause of the disposal. 278
Of course, the Court recognized that Shell had provided guidance to
purchasers to reduce spillage and thus had demonstrated that they did
not intend the spillage.279 Shell did, however, choose a method of
delivery that produced spillage (tankers instead of drums) because it
was less expensive. 280 Thus, their actions were the cause of the
spillage,281 and their actions were not an arrangement for disposaL 282
D.

Where Does that Leave Aceto?

At first glance, the intent issue appears to be fatal to the Aceto
line. 283 The Court required intent, at least to the extent that one must
intend to engage in a transaction whose purpose is to dispose of or
discard a hazardous substance. 284 The Aceto defendants intended a
transaction that may have had an element of generation and disposal
of hazardous waste. 285 That disposal of waste was at best an
unintended byproduct of a transaction whose purpose had nothing to
do with waste. 286 However, because the Burlington Northern Court
said that intent can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances,
we will need to examine the totality of circumstances to see if this
intent problem can be overcome. 287
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in Burlington Northern, can be seen as
suggesting that Aceto lives. 288 She noted that, at oral argument,
counsel for Shell was asked whether different shipping terms could
have meant that Shell would have been the owner at the time the
product was spilled. 289 Counsel responded yes. 290 Based on that, the
dissent argued that there should be liability because the shipping

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

See Gershonowitz, supra note 49, at 154.
Burlington N, 129 S. Ct. at 1875.
Jd. at 1880.
Jd. at 1885 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1875 n.1 (majority opinion).
Jd. at 1880.
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
Burlington N, 129 S. Ct. at 1879-80.
See United States v. Aceto Agric. Cherns. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1383 (8th Cir. 1989).
See id. at 1376.
See Burlington N, 129 S. Ct. at 1879-80.
See id. at 1885 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Jd. at 1885 n.2.
Jd.
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tenns should not be the detennining factor in arranger liability. 291
Underlying the dissent's reasoning is the assumption that if Shell
owned the hazardous substances at the time the substances spilled,
Shell would have been liable. 292 That premise is based on, or at least
consistent with, Aceto, where ownership was a very important
factor. 293
The dissent's assumption that ownership would make a difference
is not supported by the Court's opinion. 294 The Court said that courts
should examine the purpose of the transaction to detennine whether
the defendant had the requisite intent. 295 The purpose of the
transaction does not change based on ownership of the hazardous
substances. 296 The Court made clear that intent of the parties to the
transaction . is important to detennining whether there is an
arrangement for disposal. Intent of the parties does change with a
change in ownership. 297
Ownership goes to the issue of control, which goes to the issue of
whether a defendant can be liable as someone who is ultimately
responsible for the waste disposal. 298 Ownership is important,
therefore, only if the causation theory of arranger liability survived. 299
However, there is nothing in the Court's opinion that would suggest
that arranger liability is based on the causation or responsibility
concept.
Thus, the Second Circuit's understanding of Aceto in the AAMCO
decision 30o could not have survived. The Second Circuit understood
Aceto to be based on traditional concepts of duty. 301 In Burlington
Northern, there is no discussion of duty. 302 Indeed, one could have
argued that Shell had a duty to take additional steps to prevent the
spillage. Instead, the Court focused on whether Shell made a plan for

291. Id. Shipping terms could only be relevant if the dissent believed that ownership of the
material would change the result. See id.
292. See id.
293. See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 892 F.2d 1373, 1381 (8th Cir. 1989).
294. See Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1879-80.
295. Jd.
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 281 F.3d 812,822-23 (9th Cir. 2002).
300. See supra Part II.B.
301. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286-87 (2d Cir.
1992).
302. See Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. 1870.
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or intended the spillage. 303 The nature of the transaction is one of the
factors to be examined to determine intent. If waste is the subject of
the transaction, that could imply intent to dispose. 304
We noted above, however, that portions of the Aceto decision make
Aceto look like a generator case. 305 The Aceto court reasoned that the
Aceto defendants should be liable just as the NEPA CCO defendants
were liable. 306 In NEPACCO, the court reasoned that as generator,
the defendant had control of the waste, and that control, prior to
disposal, implied an arrangement for disposal. 307 The Eighth Circuit
in Aceto reasoned that ownership and control of the process that
generated the waste made the defendants de facto generators of that
waste. 308 As noted above, the Sixth Circuit in GenCorp and the
Eleventh Circuit in Montalvo understood Aceto as essentially a
generator case. 309 That leaves open the possibility that those cases
that rely on Aceto_could have survived. A court could examine the
Aceto fact pattern and conclude that by engaging in a transaction that
they knew would generate hazardous waste and would have to be
disposed of as part of the transaction, the defendants took intentional
steps to dispose of hazardous substances. 310
Does the complexity of the transaction prevent that interpretation?
The Burlington Northern Court was a little unclear on this point,
perhaps because the transaction at issue could not be interpreted as
other than a sale.3Il The Court stated that, "knowledge alone is
insufficient to prove that an entity 'planned for' the disposal,
particularly when the disposal occurs as a peripheral result of the
legitimate sale of an unused, useful prodUCt.,,312 One could argue that
disposal in Aceto was also a peripheral result of a legitimate nonwaste related transaction. On the other hand, the Aceto transaction
included much more than a sale. 313 The defendants provided
chemicals and instructions for formulation and received a finished
product. 314 Generation and disposal of waste were necessary parts of

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 1880.
See id. at 1878-79.
See supra Part II.A.
United States v. Aceto Agric. Cherns. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1381-82 (8th Cir. 1989).
United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743-44 (8th Cir. 1986).
Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1383-84.
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
SeeAceto,872F.2dat1381.
See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1880 (2009).
Id.
Aceto, 872 F.2d 1373.
Id. at 1375.
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the transaction. 315
If generation and disposal of waste were
necessary, maybe they were not peripheral, and a court could
conclude that the defendants in Aceto planned for the disposal.
How subsequent courts deal with the issue of what is "peripheral"
will play an important role in determining the impact of the
Burlington Northern decision. The Burlington Northern Court did
not explain whether the spillage was peripheral because the entire
transaction could be completed without any spillage or because the
transaction was essentially a sale. The Court did say, however, that
"to qualify as an arranger, Shell must have entered into the sale of DD with the intention that at least a portion of the product be disposed
of during the transfer.,,316 That suggests that peripheral does not rely
on what the essence of the transaction is.
The Burlington Northern Court discussed the efforts made by Shell
to reduce spillage. The Court inferred from those facts that Shell did
not intend the spillage. 317 That could mean that a defendant in an
Aceto-type case could reduce the likelihood of liability by giving the
formulator instructions to avoid the accidental disposal of hazardous
waste. 318 If so, the advice counsel has been providing may change.
Many have counseled clients not to get involved in other people's
waste handling matters because anything one does can lead to an
inference of control and control can result in liability.319 Now,
control is no longer a key to arranger liability, but intent is, and
actions taken to avoid disposal will indicate that disposal was not
intended and thereby reduce the likelihood of liability. 320
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has provided clear guidance regarding arranger
liability for sellers of useful non-waste products. 321 Its reasoning, by
focusing on intent, is a clear rejection of some of the appellate
arranger decisions that had addressed transactions other than the sale
of a useful product. 322 Whether the Aceto line or any portion of it can
survive, however, depends to a large extent on a number of issues left
open by the Court, particularly what intent will satisfy the intent
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id. at 1376.
BurlingtonN., 129 S. Ct. at 1880.
Id.
See id.
See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1379.
Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1879.
See id. at 1878-79.
Compare, e.g., id. at 1880, with Aceto, 872 F.2d 1373.
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requirement and how subsequent decisions determine what is
"peripheral" to a transaction.

